

28 March 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Amory

1. This is a brief recap of what has happened in your absence and what is facing us on the NSC front during the next week or so.

2. Shelters. The boss, I think, was finally convinced of the validity of the ORR estimate and on the second try I produced a briefing note which appeared to satisfy him and which he used at the NSC meeting. Although considerable scepticism remained in the minds of some Council members, no new requirements have been levied on us and the matter is now dormant pending receipt of significant new information.

3. World Situation. The boss' briefing on the world situation went over well. He read Matthias' briefing note verbatim. The reaction at the NSC meeting of the Secretary of State and the President was generally defensive. They gave indication of feeling that the estimate was critical of U.S. policy and presented a gloomier picture than they felt was warranted.

4. Debriefings. This may have occurred before you left, but Mr. Cutler has laid down new rules regarding debriefings of NSC meetings. Only one representative of each Agency may attend the debriefing session (specifically in our case, you or I) and no notes are to be taken without informing Mr. Cutler of the purpose of the note-taking and obtaining his express permission to do so. All existing notes or memoranda of NSC debriefings are to be destroyed. Query: Shall we destroy ours?

5. Limited Warfare Capabilities Study. You will recall that you recommended to the DCI that this Agency participate in this exercise. Prior to the NSC meeting, I ascertained that Mr. Cutler was going to suggest the same thing. The boss agreed with your recommendations, as did the NSC and the President. Accordingly we are already attending working group meetings. You had recommended that Komer be our representative. I have discussed this with Bob and, in view of the heavy work load on his shoulders at the moment, we have mutually agreed that I will start by doing the job, keeping him fully informed so that there will be no problem in his taking over from me if the exercise goes on beyond June 1. He will also substitute for me when there is a conflict between meetings on this exercise and Planning Board or Board Assistants meetings. It looks now as though it will be a very messy and tortuous business.

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6. Satellites and Poland. The Polish policy paper is now ready for Council action, now scheduled for April 17. The Satellites (or Soviet dominated) paper is in abeyance as far as Planning Board consideration goes until April 15 at the soonest. Meanwhile, I have on my desk (a) a complete proposed redraft of the Polish paper by Cord Meyer who is most anxious to talk to you as soon as possible; (b) a variety of conflicting comments from ONE, OCI, Lock Campbell and Cord Meyer (including the redraft from Cord). I propose in the next few days to attempt to sort these comments out and determine if and where there are any basic disagreements either with the State draft or within this Agency. In the meantime DDP is going to attempt to get its house in order so that we should have by the end of this week a consolidated DDP view on both papers. I would strongly recommend that you (a) put off initiatives by Cord Meyer to discuss this problem with you and (b) avoid bringing this problem up to the boss until I have been able to sort out the comments as received thus far and until DDP has sorted out its conflicting views. If it develops that there is a real difference of opinion between DDI components and DDP I would suggest that before bringing the dispute to the boss we consider possibility of preliminary go-around the auspices of the Board before so doing. However, there will be time to talk about this during the coming week.

7. Basic National Security Policy. Mr. Cutler plans to devote four or five meetings of the Planning Board exclusively to the review of the Basic policy paper. I do not yet know to what extent the Board Assistants will be brought into this exercise. This way of handling it does raise problems as to how you wish to handle it or to put it another way, what kind of support you want from me and from other components of the Agency. I have several alternative proposals to make to you but I think it will be more profitable for us to set aside a half hour to talk about it early this week than to attempt to put them on paper now. At the very least, I would like to fill you in orally as soon as possible on what has happened thus far.

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